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WHO IS GOVERNING WHOM? EXECUTIVES,
GOVERNANCE, AND THE STRUCTURE OF
GENEROSITY IN LARGE U.S. FIRMS
CHRISTOPHER MARQUIS* and MATTHEW LEE
Harvard Business School, Boston, Massachusetts, U.S.A.
We examine how organizational structure influences strategies over which corporate leaders have
significant discretion. Corporate philanthropy is a strategic activity commonly managed through
a specific, differentiated organizational structure—the corporate foundation—that formalizes
and constrains the influence of individual senior managers and directors on corporate strategy.
Our analysis of Fortune 500 firms from 1996 to 2006 shows that characteristics of senior
management and directors affect corporate philanthropic contributions. We also find that
organizational structure constrains the philanthropic influence of board members, but not of
senior managers, a result contrary to what existing theory would predict. We discuss how
these findings advance understanding of how organizational structure and corporate leadership
interact and how organizations can more effectively realize the strategic value of corporate social
responsibility activities. Copyright  2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
Charitable giving seems an unlikely province
for the strategies of large public companies.
Yet, research links philanthropy to strategically
important outcomes, including corporate repu-
tation (Fombrun, 1996), consumer support (Sen
and Bhattacharya, 2001) and employee commit-
ment (Greening and Turban, 2000). Strategic
philanthropy is thus increasingly seen as a way
to address ‘important social and economic goals
simultaneously, targeting areas of competitive
context where the company and society both
benefit’ (Porter and Kramer, 2002: 58). This
perspective contrasts with the prevailing critique
that corporate philanthropy functions as a man-
agerial perk and, potentially, as an exploitation
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of shareholder value for managers’ personal gain
(Friedman, 1970). Empirical evidence of a link
between social and financial performance that
might reconcile these views is mixed and inconclu-
sive (Margolis and Walsh, 2003), leaving unclear
what mechanisms may account for the increased
adoption of philanthropy into business strategies.
Recent research has begun to identify contingen-
cies that affect the strategic nature of philanthropy,
including features of organizations’ external envi-
ronments and characteristics of key stakeholders
(Barnett, 2007; Wang, Choi, and Li, 2008). But
relatively little is known about the effects of fac-
tors within the firm on corporate philanthropy.
Research has noted that corporate leaders, in par-
ticular, have significant and sometimes unchecked
discretion over philanthropic activities (Useem and
Kutner, 1986; Galaskiewicz, 1997), a key point in
the enduring criticism of philanthropy as manage-
rial largesse (Jensen, 2002). However, the specific
effects of leaders on philanthropic behavior, strate-
gic or otherwise, remain unexplored. Analysis of
leaders’ influence thus promises to shine light on
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the internal contingencies by which philanthropy
may arise as a business strategy or as agency loss.
In this study, we focus on the influence of actors
in publicly traded firms’ upper echelons—senior
management and boards of directors—and exam-
ine how the formal structure governing philan-
thropic activities may enable or constrain this
influence. We show that corporate philanthropy
is influenced by two intraorganizational factors:
(1) the idiosyncratic qualities of individual cor-
porate leaders, such as their organizational tenure,
centrality in inter-corporate networks, and gender,
and (2) organizational structures that systematize
and align decision making with the strategy of
the firm. Our study thus integrates upper echelons
theory, which focuses on how individual senior
managers influence firm strategies and governance
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984), with research on
how an organization’s structural features constrain
its strategy (Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003; Davis,
Eisenhardt, and Bingham, 2009). While the devel-
opment of organizational structures is traditionally
viewed as enabling leaders to translate strategy
into action (e.g., Chandler, 1962), we find evidence
of the reverse: Organizational structure constrains
individual corporate leaders’ influence on corpo-
rate philanthropic activities.
To empirically test our hypotheses, we con-
structed and analyzed a unique dataset of the
corporate philanthropy of Fortune 500 companies
during the period from 1996 to 2006. We focused
on large firms because of their dominant role in
corporate philanthropy in the United States. Most
corporations with sales over $500 million have
philanthropy programs, while many small compa-
nies do not (Useem and Kutner, 1986). Large-firm
philanthropy is also conducted on a much larger
scale: Fortune 100 companies donated a median of
approximately $50 million in 2007 (Coady, 2008)
and a recent study suggests that the philanthropy
of the largest 200 U.S. companies accounts for
the majority of total corporate philanthropy in the
United States (Cavicchio and Turok, 2008). Thus,
our study pertains not only to the literature on
how upper echelons influence corporate strategy
but also provides a novel empirical lens on the
increasingly important context of corporate phi-
lanthropy.
Our findings extend research on upper eche-
lons and organizational behavior in a number of
ways. First, we show that the gender composition
of the senior team and board influences strategic
outcomes such as philanthropy, an important find-
ing given the increasing gender balance in corpo-
rate leadership. Second, while upper echelons the-
ory has found that senior management effects are
moderated by external forces (Hambrick, 2007),
we show that a differentiated structural element
within an organization may also modify the dis-
cretion of senior leaders to influence corporate
strategies. Third, while governance research has
shown directors to be influential in myriad cor-
porate practices (Mizruchi, 1996), the idea that
organizational structures constrain their influence
on strategy has not previously been established.
Fourth, our findings contribute to a recent trend
in studying the antecedents of philanthropic activ-
ity (Marquis, Glynn, and Davis, 2007). We close
with a discussion of how corporations can more
effectively realize the strategic benefits of corpo-
rate social responsibility activities such as philan-
thropy.
UPPER ECHELONS, CORPORATE
STRUCTURE, AND PHILANTHROPY
Upper echelons research focuses on the ways in
which the biases, egos, aptitudes, experiences, and
other individual characteristics of senior leaders
influence the range of strategic options they con-
sider and the decision-making processes by which
they select from among those options (Finkel-
stein, Hambrick, and Cannella, 2009). Specific
areas of strategic decision making are influenced
by senior leadership characteristics related to that
domain. These include stable individual differ-
ences; for instance, research finds a link between
an executive’s personality type and his or her like-
lihood of accepting investment proposals (Nutt,
1986). Other upper echelon effects are contin-
gent on a senior leader’s experience and embed-
dedness; for instance, marketing and sales expe-
rience among executives increases a company’s
likelihood of converting innovation investments
into new products, reflecting the particular impor-
tance of a customer focus to this process (Barbosa,
1985).
An important moderator of upper echelon effects
is managerial discretion—the range of behaviors
considered acceptable for the firm’s leaders (Ham-
brick and Finkelstein, 1987). The effects of senior
managers’ predispositions on company strategy are
greater where managerial discretion is wide than
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where it is more constrained. The factors determin-
ing managerial discretion range from the cognitive
flexibility of the managers themselves (Hambrick
and Finkelstein, 1987) to features of the firm’s
external environment—for example, its industry
(Hambrick and Abrahamson, 1995). Notably, dis-
cretion also depends on internal organizational fac-
tors, specifically ‘the degree to which the organiza-
tion is amenable to an array of possible actions and
empowers the executive to formulate and execute
those actions’ (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990:
489). Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) show that
the influence of individual managers varies with
organizational factors that include the extent of
slack resources and organization size.
Formal organizational structure is traditionally
conceptualized as the outcome of a design process
that enables senior leaders to translate their chosen
strategies into action (Chandler, 1962). However,
there also exists the possibility of adverse, con-
straining effects of structure on managerial dis-
cretion. Organizational structures formalize key
decision-making processes; in particular, the way
in which resources are allocated among compet-
ing organizational functions and goals (Pfeffer and
Salancik, 1974; Pfeffer, 1981). By creating formal
structure, actors in the upper echelons of organiza-
tions may create conditions, perhaps unwittingly,
that constrain their subsequent ability to pursue
their goals. To the extent that senior leaders’ goals
vary as a result of the idiosyncratic individual char-
acteristics and experiences identified by the upper
echelons literature, existing organizational struc-
tures might limit the subset of these goals that can
be enacted.
Applying this argument to the context of cor-
porate philanthropy, the existence in a corporation
of a dedicated formal structure such as a corporate
foundation would be expected to limit any par-
ticular corporate leader’s personal influence over
giving. In our hypotheses below, we first iden-
tify the leadership characteristics that may affect
a firm’s philanthropy. In the following section, we
explore the role of the corporate foundation as a
structural device to constrain managers’ discretion
over corporate philanthropy.
Upper echelons and corporate philanthropy
Corporate philanthropy strategy is primarily for-
mulated at the top. Previous studies have shown
that firm-level philanthropic behaviors are influ-
enced by individual-level characteristics of the
managers responsible for disbursement (Galask-
iewicz, 1997) and by the relationships of senior
management with leaders of other companies and
nonprofit organizations (Useem and Kutner, 1986;
Galaskiewicz, 1997). To unpack the effects of
upper echelons on corporate philanthropy, we
examined both senior executives and board mem-
bers, investigating factors including individual
differences, organizational experience, and social
embeddedness. Based on these criteria and on
data availability, we focus on senior-executive-
level characteristics such as chief executive officer
(CEO) tenure and the gender composition of the
senior executive team, and on board-level charac-
teristics such as board size, gender composition,
and the network connections of board members
with the boards of other large companies. In the
following sections, we theorize about the effect of
these characteristics on corporate philanthropy and
make empirical hypotheses.
CEO tenure
Among senior managers, CEOs have traditionally
held prominent roles in determining their compa-
nies’ philanthropy. Multiple surveys have iden-
tified the company CEO as the central figure
in the establishment of a firm’s giving policies
(Siegfried, McElroy, and Biernot-Fawkes, 1983;
Useem and Kutner 1986). In a study of corpo-
rate philanthropic activity in the greater Minneapo-
lis area during the 1980s, Galaskiewicz (1985,
1997) described how local CEOs gained individ-
ual prestige through their companies’ generosity.
Some philanthropically minded managers avoid
high individual taxes by informally taking some
portion of their compensation as corporate dona-
tions, known as ‘through-the-firm giving’ (Wolch,
1995: 26). Other CEO intervention is directly
observable. For example, Dave Thomas, the late
CEO of Wendy’s Old Fashioned Hamburgers, who
was himself adopted, focused his firm’s philan-
thropy on adoption issues (Marquis et al ., 2007).
Upper echelons research similarly theorizes
about the unique importance of CEOs and their
characteristics in determining a firm’s behavior
(Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007). In the context of
philanthropy, research suggests a link with CEO
tenure. A well-developed line of research high-
lights changes in a CEO’s behavior over the course
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of his or her tenure (e.g., Hambrick and Fuku-
tomi, 1991). Early on, CEOs are highly attuned
to their external environments and are relatively
more likely to adapt to them. For instance, the
likelihood of implementing strategic change is
greater for senior management teams with shorter
tenures (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). However, as
time goes on, CEOs become ‘stale in the saddle’
(Miller, 1991) and tend to conform to the strategies
of peer companies in the same industry (Finkel-
stein and Hambrick, 1990). Externally focused,
discretionary activities such as philanthropy would
therefore be expected to diminish as CEO tenure
increases.
Hypothesis 1: Corporations with shorter-
tenured CEOs will have higher philanthropic
contributions .
Directors’ social embeddedness
Directors have a less formal but still prominent
role in determining philanthropic activities. While
not as deeply involved as senior managers in
day-to-day decision making, boards are an impor-
tant buffer for the organization in how it inte-
grates external demands with internal strategy
(Davis, 2005; Kacperczyk, 2009). In this role, the
social embeddedness of the board’s members may
broaden its exposure to potential philanthropic
projects. Research has shown the relational net-
work linking corporate decision makers to be one
of the most important mechanisms for stimulating
giving by large firms. Useem (1984), for instance,
found that companies with highly-connected direc-
tors were on average more generous contributors,
particularly to arts organizations. Galaskiewicz’s
20-year study of corporate philanthropy in Min-
neapolis showed that corporate leaders’ social con-
nections to other local businesspeople transmitted
norms and practices of corporate giving and cor-
porate social responsibility (Galaskiewicz, 1985,
1997).
Hypothesis 2a: Corporations with boards of
directors that are more central in the director
interlock network will have higher corporate
philanthropic contributions .
A second, related feature of the board is its
number of directors. Prior cross-sectional work
in economics has shown that firms with larger
boards donate more, which the authors attribute
to free-rider problems and the greater difficulty
that large boards have in monitoring the corpo-
ration (Aggarwal and Nanda, 2004). Studies of
the influence of board size on setting strategy also
suggest that large boards have more difficulty coor-
dinating activities and may be more vulnerable to
fractures and the emergence of special interests
(Goodstein, Gautam, and Boeker, 1994). Organiza-
tional research suggests that individual peer pres-
sure is an important mechanism leading boards to
give (Marquis et al ., 2007). While greater network
connections should lead to greater individual pres-
sure on directors to give, larger board sizes likely
increase opportunities to give, possibly with less
constraint on individual interests.
Hypothesis 2b: Corporations with larger boards
will have higher corporate philanthropic contri-
butions .
Gender composition of senior management and
board of directors
Philanthropic giving by women tends to be higher
than giving by men, although this effect has many
contingencies (see Mesch, 2009 for a review). At
the individual level, research on gender and phi-
lanthropy has shown that women give more money
than men despite lower average levels of discre-
tionary income (Capek, 2001) and that women are
less sensitive to the ‘price’ of giving (Andreoni and
Vesterlund, 2001). Importantly for our setting, the
positive link between women and levels of giving
appears to be especially significant in social and
organizational contexts. In cooperative laboratory
teams, the presence of women may cause men to
be more philanthropically generous (Kamas, Pre-
ston, and Baum, 2008). The Center for Women’s
Business Research (1999) has shown that, among
businesses with assets greater than $1 million, over
half of women business owners contributed at least
$10,000 annually to charity, compared to only 40
percent of men. These gendered philanthropic pref-
erences may translate to a greater philanthropic
focus by woman-led companies.
Such a relationship may also stem from gen-
dered roles within corporations. In corporate
philanthropy, leaders of the foundation or the
functional unit in which philanthropic activities
take place are disproportionately women (Conry,
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1998). Research on gender in organizations consis-
tently highlights the importance of sex-segregated
occupations to organizational outcomes (Ely and
Padavic, 2007). Thus, it could also be that senior
women are disproportionately represented in the
corporate leadership roles that are closest to phi-
lanthropy and so are more likely to influence it.
We predict that the combination of individual dif-
ferences and gendered roles will lead corporations
with more women senior managers to be more gen-
erous.
Hypothesis 3: Corporations with a greater pro-
portion of women senior managers will have
higher corporate philanthropic contributions .
In addition, several studies support a potential
link between philanthropy and a higher number
of women at the director level. A recent study
based on interviews with 50 women directors from
Fortune 1000 boards suggested that an increased
presence of women on boards would lead firms to
raise issues that pertain to multiple stakeholders
such as firms’ communities (Konrad, Kramer,
and Erkut, 2008), which are typically the targets
of philanthropy. Following the occupational sex-
segregation argument presented above, it may
be that female directors are more likely to be
from nonprofit backgrounds (Williams, 2003),
which would give them greater awareness of
and exposure to corporate philanthropy ideas;
firms with more women directors may therefore
be more likely to take up those philanthropic
activities.
Hypothesis 4: Corporations with more women
on the board will have higher corporate philan-
thropic contributions .
The moderating effect of organizational
structure on corporate philanthropy
Managerial discretion over corporate philanthropic
activities is particularly high, in part because the
link between philanthropy and specific business
and social outcomes is difficult to observe, and
therefore difficult to monitor. In the absence of for-
mal structures and decision-making processes for
philanthropy, corporate leaders frequently assume
ad hoc control over all aspects of a company’s phi-
lanthropy strategy, including the overall amount of
giving and the portfolio of recipients (Useem and
Kutner, 1986). As a result, decision-making pro-
cesses under these conditions are highly varied,
frequently informal, and largely focused on rela-
tional patronage rather than on recipients’ merit.
Warren Buffett, a veteran of corporate boards, said
of one company’s philanthropy decision-making
process that ‘the whole thing was based on fig-
uring out who was connected to whom’ (Kinsley
2008: 33).
An important development in contemporary cor-
porate philanthropy as a strategic activity is the
corporate foundation, a legally separate entity cre-
ated to manage the parent corporation’s philan-
thropy. As the scale of corporate philanthropy
has increased, so have demands by stakeholders
for internal accountability and efficiency. These
pressures have led corporations to organize foun-
dations with increasingly well-defined roles, pro-
cesses, and organizational forms managed by spe-
cialized professionals (Useem and Kutner, 1986)
in areas such as public relations, gift administra-
tion, and reporting. The establishment of a cor-
porate foundation also gives the funding company
more control over the regularity and tax impact
of its gifts. Slightly more than half of large-
firm foundations maintain endowments, which
allow them to ‘smooth’ their giving and subse-
quent goodwill over time, making them less sensi-
tive to the firm’s financial circumstances (Wolch,
1995). A national study of corporate founda-
tions conducted in 2007 found that over 50 per-
cent had been founded since 1990, suggesting
the increasing use of foundations to strategically
direct corporate philanthropy (Foundation Center,
2009).
Consistent with research on organizations that
shows organization size to be an important reflec-
tion of the degree of structural differentiation
(Child, 1973; Davis et al ., 2009), larger corporate
foundations tend to be more structurally differen-
tiated from the rest of the firm. Size permits foun-
dations to hire dedicated staff, establish greater
independence, and follow specialized processes for
charitable decision making. A recent survey of
corporate philanthropy programs found that those
giving under $5 million annually had a median
of two full-time employees dedicated solely to
philanthropic activities, whereas those giving over
$100 million had a median of 24 (Coady, 2008).
Foundation size also indicates the relative power
of the corporate foundation as a political entity
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competing for limited company resources (Pfeffer,
1981).
In short, the formalization of corporate philan-
thropy through the creation and endowment of
a structurally differentiated foundation for cor-
porate philanthropy may constrain the discre-
tion of senior managers and board members.
Through these structures, senior leaders cede
control to specialized professionals located in
an independent authority responsible for consis-
tency with overall firm strategy. Thus, we pre-
dict that the size of the foundation—reflecting
structural differentiation and overall power within
the organization—moderates the main effects of
senior managers on corporate philanthropy hypoth-
esized above.
Hypothesis 5a: Greater corporate foundation
assets will reduce the effect of CEO tenure on
corporate philanthropic contributions .
Hypothesis 5b: Greater corporate foundation
assets will reduce the effect of the presence of
women senior managers on corporate philan-
thropic contributions .
We would also expect the effects of director
characteristics to be moderated by the size of
the foundation. As an important interface between
the corporation and broader society (Davis, 2005),
the board is involved in setting corporate policy
and funneling requests from outside constituen-
cies. The independence of the specialized phil-
anthropic processes by which these requests are
handled will vary depending on the size and dif-
ferentiation of the corporate foundation. Thus, we
believe that the extent to which directors’ networks
and embeddedness outside the corporation lead
their corporations to contribute greater amounts is
also reduced by having larger corporate founda-
tions.
Hypothesis 6a: Greater corporate foundation
assets will reduce the effect of (i) board network
centrality and (ii) board size on corporate
philanthropic contributions .
Hypothesis 6b: Greater corporate foundation
assets will reduce the effect of the presence
of women directors on corporate philanthropic
contributions .
METHODS AND ANALYSES
Sample and units of analysis
To test the hypothesized upper echelon and corpo-
rate foundation effects on corporate philanthropy,
we assembled data on the Fortune 500 companies
for even-numbered years during the period 1996 to
2006. The two-year period between observations
was largely based on the availability of some key
variables, as described below. Owing to missing
observations for some of our variables, we tested
our predictions on a dataset that includes approxi-
mately 2,100 company-years.
Dependent variable
We manually recorded the total dollar amount
of corporate philanthropy from the National
Directory of Corporate Giving in the years that
match our sample (Foundation Center, 1997, 1999,
2001, 2003, 2005, 2007; odd-numbered years
report data from the even-numbered years of
our sample). We log-transformed this variable to
reduce highly skewed values.
Independent variables
From the same directory, we recorded foundation
assets . Approximately 70 percent of companies in
our sample have foundations; for companies with-
out a foundation, this variable was given the value
of zero. Our conceptualization of structure in terms
of size builds on existing literature that views
organizational structure as a measurable construct,
with monotonically increasing effects (Davis et al .,
2009). We log-transformed the level of founda-
tion assets because organizational structure does
not increase linearly with size, but rather increases
marginally less as the organization grows (Pondy,
1969). The CEO tenure of each corporation in
our sample was obtained from Standard & Poor’s
ExecuComp database. Percentage women senior
managers, number of directors , and percentage
of women directors were obtained from Catalyst
publications (Catalyst, 1996–2007). The degree
centrality of board members is calculated from
the network of shared directors among the boards
of all public firms in 1997 and 2002. A board’s
1997 value was also assigned to 1996, 1998, and
2000 and its 2002 value was assigned to 2002,
2004, and 2006. While we would ideally observe
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these data every year, prior research suggests that
these networks remain stable over time (Mizruchi,
1996).
Control variables
At the organization level, we controlled for mea-
sures of financial performance, size, age, industry,
and CEO age. Past studies have repeatedly demon-
strated the influence on philanthropy of financial
performance (e.g., Navarro, 1988), operationalized
as return on assets (ROA). Firm size is seen to be
another important factor, as larger firms have not
only greater resources but also higher visibility in
the marketplace (Wolch, 1995). We operational-
ized size as firm logged sales . We believe that the
age of a corporation is also an important factor, as
older companies would likely be more embedded
in philanthropy networks. There may also be an
imprinting effect due to older firms being founded
during an earlier era when philanthropic contribu-
tions were more institutionalized (Marquis, Davis,
and Glynn, forthcoming). We also included CEO
age to control for any potential cohort effect on
philanthropy that may be related to CEO tenure. A
number of studies have postulated industry differ-
ences for philanthropy (Galaskiewicz, 1997), so a
series of industry indicators was included to make
sure that the philanthropic patterns observed were
not a function of different industry effects. We
included variables for the following industries that
have previously been shown to have specific giv-
ing profiles or preferences: manufacturing , retail ,
financial , and service (Wolch, 1995; Brammer and
Millington, 2005). The reference category for these
indicators is all other industries that have not been
shown to have specific giving interests or prefer-
ences: agriculture, mining and construction, trans-
portation and communication, and government.1
Finally, to account for organization-wide gender
effects, we controlled for the percentage of women
employment in the industry, measured at the two-
digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code
level. These data were from the United States
decennial census, with the 1990 values used for
years 1996 and 1998 and the 2000 values used for
2000–2006.
1 Results are the same when we add a control variable for each
major industry group (one-digit SIC). We report models with
this reduced list of controls as they are relevant to the literature
on corporate philanthropy.
Prior research suggests that the location of the
corporate headquarters is an important determinant
of philanthropy (Marquis et al ., 2007) and that
community features such as poverty that draws
attention to social needs (Weisbrod, 1998) and tax
rates that provide incentives (Webb, 1994) may
result in greater corporate giving. We therefore
included the per capita income (from the U.S. Cen-
sus) and governmental revenue per capita (from
the Census of Governments2) of the core-based
statistical area (CBSA) of the companies’ head-
quarters. Finally, to control for other time effects,
indicator variables for each of the years 1998 to
2006—with 1996 as the reference category—were
included in the models.
Statistical model
To analyze our panel data, we used the xtreg com-
mand in STATA with the random-effects option.
As noted, we included year fixed effects to control
for any unobserved time effects and used the clus-
ter subcommand in STATA to adjust our standard
errors to account for the multiple observations per
corporation. An alternative approach—to include
firm fixed effects—was not ideal because of our
interest in including time-invariant variables, such
as industry indicators, that prior research had
shown to be important determinants of philan-
thropy. We did, however, estimate fixed-effects
models without these time-invariant variables and
obtained similar results.
RESULTS
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and corre-
lations and Table 2 presents the results of our
analyses.3 Model 1 estimates the coefficients of our
control variables. Models 2 through 6 estimate the
main effects of each of our theorized variables for
each of the leadership attributes hypothesized to
2 Taken every five years in years ending in 2 and 7. Again, a
firm’s 1997 value was also assigned to 1996, 1998, and 2000
and its 2002 value was assigned to 2002, 2004, and 2006.
3 Because there are some high individual correlations and since
we have a large number of interaction effects, we present each of
our main effect findings in separate equations. We furthermore
ran regression diagnostics and found that that none of the
variables in the equations we present had a variance inflation
factor greater than 10, the recommended maximum threshold
(Gujarati, 2003).
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influence overall philanthropy: CEO tenure, board
centrality, board size, female senior managers, and
female directors. Model 7 contains all of these
main effects. Models 8 through 12 estimate the
effect of the size of the corporate foundation by
adding the interaction of foundation assets with
each of the two senior-manager attributes and each
of the three board attributes. Model 13 is a full
model containing all of the aforementioned vari-
ables. This model is presented for informational
purposes only, as the inclusion of so many inter-
action effects makes interpretation of individual
estimators difficult.
Main effects
Model 2 estimates that the coefficient on CEO
tenure is negative and significant, providing sup-
port for Hypothesis 1. Post hoc analyses of the
philanthropy of companies with new CEOs suggest
that this effect is based on new CEOs increas-
ing philanthropy rather than longstanding CEOs
detaching from it. Models 3 and 4 investigate the
relationship between board attributes and philan-
thropy. Model 3 shows a positive and significant
estimate of the effect of board centrality, support-
ing Hypothesis 2a. Model 4 shows that the effect of
the number of directors on philanthropy is positive
and significant, supporting Hypothesis 2b. Model
5 estimates a positive and significant effect of the
presence of female senior managers on philan-
thropy, supporting Hypothesis 3. It is notable that
the control variables show an opposite, negative
effect of the overall proportion of women employ-
ees in a company’s industry. This contrast high-
lights the remarkable main effect of female senior
managers on giving. Model 6 estimates the main
effect of the proportion of female board members
on overall philanthropy and finds a positive and
significant coefficient, supporting Hypothesis 4.
Interaction with corporate foundation effects
Models 8 through 12 show that the main effects of
senior manager influence on philanthropy are not
significantly moderated by foundation size. The
effects of board member influence, however, are
significantly constrained by a company’s corpo-
rate foundation. Model 8 estimates the interaction
effect of foundation assets and CEO tenure and
finds that the effect on philanthropy is not sig-
nificant, failing to provide support for Hypothe-
sis 5a. Model 9 estimates the interaction effect
of women senior managers and foundation assets
with no significant effect, so Hypothesis 5b is also
unsupported. Models 10 and 11 show that having a
larger foundation diminishes the previously shown
effects of board attributes, supporting Hypothesis
6a. Model 12 estimates a significant negative effect
of foundation size on the influence of the propor-
tion of female board members, supporting Hypoth-
esis 6b. Interestingly, the size of the corporate
foundation moderates the effect of women direc-
tors, but not of women senior managers, on phi-
lanthropy. The presence of the moderating effect
on boards but not on management holds for the
other main effects as well, leading us to conclude
that corporate foundation structure constrains the
influence of directors on philanthropy, but not the
influence of senior managers. We address possible
reasons for this in the discussion section.
Control variables
Examining the control variables highlights a num-
ber of additional noteworthy relationships. Regard-
ing the corporate-level factors previously consid-
ered, it is somewhat surprising that ROA is not sig-
nificant, although sales is significant across mod-
els. One interpretation, consistent with the liter-
ature (Margolis and Walsh, 2003), is that phi-
lanthropy is driven more by a firm’s size and
visibility in the marketplace than by its finan-
cial performance. Age has a positive and signif-
icant coefficient, supporting our prior speculation
regarding the imprinting effects on firms’ phil-
anthropic behavior (Marquis et al ., forthcoming).
Our results support prior findings that manufac-
turing, financial, service, and retail firms all tend
to be more philanthropically generous than other
types of firms. CEO age did not have an effect on
philanthropy, supporting our conclusion that our
CEO tenure effects are a result of the processes
we theorize as opposed to cohort effects. Regard-
ing features of the firm’s headquarters community,
the coefficient on per capita income is positive and
significant, showing that even after the inclusion
of a wide array of other factors, community-level
economic effects are still an important determi-
nant of philanthropy (Marquis et al ., forthcoming).
Additionally, local tax rate has a significant neg-
ative coefficient across all the models, supporting
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prior research that suggests that corporate philan-
thropy and governmental services are substitutes
(Salamon, 1987).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Our study focused on the ways that organizational
structure regulates the idiosyncratic influence of
individual corporate leaders on corporate philan-
thropy. A number of individual-level and team-
level characteristics of senior management and the
board of directors—including CEO tenure, direc-
tor degree centrality, board size, the percentage
of women senior managers, and the percentage of
women directors—were shown to affect corporate
philanthropic contributions. Furthermore, and per-
haps more importantly, we found that the presence
of a corporate foundation negatively moderated the
effect of the directors’ characteristics on philan-
thropy but not the effect of senior managers’ char-
acteristics on philanthropy. Most research on orga-
nizational structure and leadership has depicted
leaders and specialized structures as complemen-
tary forces contributing to a unified strategy. Our
findings, however, provide evidence of tensions
between leaders and structures and evidence that
specialized structures function as an important
check on how corporate leaders, particularly direc-
tors, influence strategy.
Our findings that the size of a founda-
tion constrains the influence of directors on
philanthropy—but not the influence of senior
managers—break with prevailing assumptions on
governance. In the case of corporate philanthropy,
structure’s moderating effects on director agency
appears to exceed parallel effects on senior
managers. Because senior managers have formal
day-to-day purview over the organization, they
may be more able than directors to co-opt internal
structures to their ends. With less proximity
to the organization, directors may therefore be
more constrained by organizational structure.
The generalizability of our argument is enhanced
by the observation of this effect across both
directors in general and women directors in
particular. We also examined the possible exis-
tence of moderated relationships between board
and senior management team features, but—in
unreported results—found no support for such
effects. Examining the strategic consequences of
interactions between directors, senior managers,
and organizational structure is a ripe area for
future research.
Our main effect findings also show patterns that
are relevant to advancing research on upper eche-
lons and the growing literature on corporate social
responsibility strategies. Our finding that corpo-
rate giving decreases with CEO tenure supports
theories that depict the early years of a CEO’s
tenure as qualitatively different from later periods
(Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991). Additional anal-
yses support this result, showing that it is primarily
increases in corporate giving during the first two
years of CEO tenure that are responsible for this
effect.
Further research could employ more granular
data and perhaps different methods to examine
more subtle dynamics underlying each of the main
effects we explored in our broad analysis. For
instance, it is plausible that the mechanisms under-
lying the influence of structure on leader effects
varies among different characteristics. Other char-
acteristics of interest that were not accessible to
us given current data limitations include diversity
measures that influence cognitive patterns, such as
ethnicity, functional work experience, educational
background, geographic origin, and age (Kilduff,
Angelmar, and Mehra, 2000). Future research in
these areas should explore additional variables at
both the senior management and board levels to
build a comprehensive understanding of the upper
echelon characteristics germane to corporate phi-
lanthropy.
The finding that the increased presence of
women senior managers and directors leads firms
to make greater philanthropic contributions not
only adds an important gender component to upper
echelons theory (van Knippenberg et al ., 2011),
but also provides additional evidence of the com-
plex relationship between gender and philanthropy
(Mesch, 2009). One explanation for these find-
ings that is consistent with the literature is that
women senior managers and directors may recog-
nize greater value in the external relationships that
are strengthened by corporate philanthropy (Kon-
rad et al ., 2008). Our finding of the positive effects
of female corporate leaders on philanthropy was in
stark contrast to a significant negative effect of
female employment on philanthropy, suggesting
the presence of distinctive gendered mechanisms
relating to gender and senior leaders. Of particular
interest for future research is the effect of gender
at the CEO level, since this position is so central to
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corporate philanthropy and to corporate strategy in
general. During the period of our sample, the num-
ber of female Fortune 500 CEOs grew from zero
in 1996 to nine in 2006 to 14 in 2010. This num-
ber was too small to permit statistical tests in this
study, but we strongly believe that future research
should investigate the implications of CEO gender,
whether through statistical or qualitative methods.
Finally, we also believe that our paper illumi-
nates a key element of the interaction between
corporations and society, an increasingly impor-
tant topic (Marquis et al ., forthcoming). As noted,
while researchers recently have guided managers
toward strategic philanthropy (Porter and Kramer,
2002), they have failed to reach consensus on the
directional effect that socially oriented activities
such as philanthropy have on firm performance,
let alone to understand the subtleties of how these
activities actually influence important firm out-
comes (Margolis and Walsh, 2003). Our findings
help unpack the influence of senior leaders, but
furthermore suggest that organizational structures
and processes can be a powerful tool with which
to enact strategic corporate social responsibility.
Following this view, we suggest that corporations
should increasingly utilize structures such as the
corporate foundation to manage philanthropy as a
strategic activity, rather than defer these decisions
to the judgment of powerful individuals. While
some corporate leaders may treat social respon-
sibility programs as discretionary, or simply as
part of the ‘overhead’ of doing business in certain
locales, organizational structure offers a potentially
powerful tool to harness their elusive strategic ben-
efits.
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